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Soviet collective memory meant to 
legitimize control and unify its peo-
ple. Decades later, the collapse of 
communism challenged the monu-
ments’ purpose by extinguishing the 
ideology they originally memorial-
ized. In examining the post-com-
munist and contemporary contexts 
of the memorials, this paper intends 
to answer how the Soviet Union is 
memorialized in Berlin. 
 Ideology, wartime experience, 
and symbolic location were signifi-
cant factors contributing to the So-
viet decision to erect war memorials 
in Berlin. The fierce rivalry between 
communism and fascism had a pro-
found impact on twentieth century 
European affairs. From an outsider’s 
lens in the 1920s, fascism and com-
munism seemed remarkably similar. 
Seizures of power in Italy, Germany, 
and the Soviet Union occurred with-
in years of one another.2 They also 
appeared to share totalitarian ruling 
styles, manipulating the masses and 
violently suppressing dissent.3 
 However, substantial ideological 
differences drove communism and 
fascism against one another domes-
tically. Each party’s extreme beliefs 
generated polarization and a “revo-
lutionary rivalry.”4 To demonstrate 
their ideological superiority, states 
enacted measures to undermine 
their ideological rivals. Examples 
include Mussolini’s ban on the Ital-
ian Communist Party in 1926 and 
widespread use of propaganda.5 On 
the international stage, this rival-
ry was not immediate, as relations 
remained cordial for some time. 
Nonetheless, steps taken internal-
ly to quash rival ideologies laid the 
Berlin has a tumultuous past, having been the capital of Prussia and the German em-
pire before the democratic Weimar 
Republic, overtaken by Nazi Ger-
many, followed by the Iron Curtain’s 
divide, and finally a unified mod-
ern Germany. Berlin’s public space 
reflects its volatile history.1 Street 
names, buildings, and monuments 
document the rise and fall of Ger-
many over the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries. 
 In the wake of the Second World 
War, the Soviet Union constructed 
three memorials honoring fallen 
Red Army soldiers in Berlin. The 
intention was to impose messages 
of victory, sacrifice, and ideological 
superiority onto the German pop-
ulation. They also celebrated the 
idealized “Great Patriotic War” – a 
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framework for later external con-
flict.  
 Though government control 
quelled internal challenges to pow-
er, external security concerns exac-
erbated tensions in three instances. 
First, Adolph Hitler’s ascent to pow-
er in the 1930s frightened Soviet 
leaders. It showed the Soviets that 
fascism would not limit itself to de-
veloping states and pushed them to 
seek more collective security.6 The 
Soviet view of fascism’s expansion-
ary desires reinforced their percep-
tion of Hitler as an existential threat. 
Second, the Spanish Civil War was 
the first example of direct struggle 
between communists and fascists. 
The Soviets displayed aversion to 
war by electing not to match Ger-
man and Italian intervention for 
fear of further escalating violence.7  
 Finally, the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact of 1939 revealed different lev-
els of understanding and trust. Hit-
ler believed the Pact attained Sovi-
et neutrality in German affairs, but 
Stalin interpreted it more deeply,as 
an opportunity to expand territo-
ry without provoking Germany.8 
Nonetheless, Hitler regarded Soviet 
expansion into Southeastern Eu-
rope as a threat and this contribut-
ed to the German invasion of 1941.9 
Despite the agreement to divide 
Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union 
and Germany watched each other 
carefully, wary of the other gaining 
more power. 
 Fueled by security concerns, 
rampant propaganda exacerbated 
ideological tensions and heightened 
competition between Soviet com-
munists and German and Italian 
fascists. The German invasion of 
the Soviet Union brought the rivalry 
to war. A long four years of savage 
fighting constituted the ultimate test 
to determine the superior ideology. 
 The German justification for in-
vading the Soviet Union reveals the 
ideological intention to wage war 
against communist society. Weh-
rmacht Lieutenant-General Otto 
Lancelle explained to his soldiers in 
1941 that they would be fighting the 
war of “National Socialism against 
Bolshevism,” to defeat Soviet “de-
struction of the world… and cul-
tural assets.”10 German commanders 
described the “conflict of two Welt-
anschauungen” (roughly translated 
as “ideology”) as Germany’s “fight 
for survival” and “defense of Euro-
pean culture.”11This language con-
veys the perception of an alarming 
communist threat. The incorpora-
tion of ideology emphasizes its no-
tability in rationalizing war. 
 Emboldened by ideological rhet-
oric, the Eastern Front was marked 
by extreme brutality. German mili-
tary doctrine called for decisive vic-
tory achieved by rapid mobilization 
and annihilation of enemy forces.12 
Understanding the Soviet advantag-
es of fighting on their own ground, 
greater manpower, and more re-
sources, the Germans attacked full 
throttle and destroyed everything in 
their path.13 The Soviets matched the 
Wehrmacht’s cruelty through con-
ventional and partisan resistance. 
Despite the quick German advance, 
Soviet soldiers were known to fight 
to the last man.14 In one particu-
lar instance of such “underhanded 
methods,” a unit pretended to be 
dead and attacked a German group 
from behind, inflicting 90 casual-
ties.15 Underlying ideological impli-
cations translated into exceptional 
displays of determination. 
 The Germans proved no less harsh 
off the battlefield, seeking to destroy 
communist society. Wehrmacht sol-
diers willingly participated in atroc-
ities against Soviet civilians, like  “… 
the plundering of foodstuffs and the 
resulting starvation of Soviet civil-
ians… and a ruthless anti-partisan 
policy that resulted in the deaths 
of large numbers of alleged “gueril-
las.”16 The Eastern Front was much 
more than two states fighting one 
another for material resources or 
control of land – it decided which 
ideology was superior. 
 The Soviets repulsed the inva-
sion and defeated the Germans, 
though at an astronomical price. 
The war’s human cost amounted to 
25-35 million Soviets, an estimated 
two-thirds of which were civilians.17 
The war devastated infrastructure, 
destroying 70,000 towns, 6 million 
homes, 32,000 factories, and thou-
sands of miles of roads and railroad 
tracks. The unimaginably destruc-
tive Battle of Stalingrad exemplified 
Soviet resistance through “street by 
street, house by house, sometimes 
room by room” defense. Years later, 
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the war would connote the battle to 
survivors, recalling it before other 
memories. 
 The Soviet victory over Germany 
brought several significant conse-
quences. First, the Soviets perceived 
it as a demonstration of commu-
nist superiority to fascism, helping 
to consolidate fully and legitimize 
the Soviet regime in the eyes of the 
people it governed. Furthermore, 
it demonstrated the utility of pro-
paganda, depicting the “other” as a 
“perpetual foil.” Using “the other” 
boosted morale during the war and 
would later prove crucial in uniting 
people around the Soviet victory in 
the so-called Great Patriotic War. 
The totality of victory – not only re-
pelling invasion to pre-war borders 
but capturing the German capital – 
permitted the Soviet imposition of 
policy, ideology, and war narrative 
onto the German population. The 
war, as remembered by the Soviets, 
had a profound impact on the plan-
ning of memorials in Berlin. 
 Berlin’s symbolic status as a cap-
ital city compounded the meaning 
of Soviet memorialization. Capitals 
have historically gained significant 
status for their political, economic, 
and cultural prominence.18 This hi-
erarchical status granted the capital 
a significant role in communicating 
“desired meanings” through dis-
plays of social, political, and cultural 
control.19 To outside states, capitals 
became symbolic of the whole state 
and a target for invasion.20 It was 
largely the cultural function which 
signified capitals. 
 The Nazi Party’s imposition of 
ideology was evident through its 
transformation of Berlin and cer-
emonies in the interwar period. 
Hitler communicated the “national 
identity” of the new German state 
in Berlin by combining architec-
tural style and grandeur to denote 
modernization, authoritarianism, 
and intimidation.21 Rituals and pa-
rades added to the expression of 
Nazi identity.22 Berlin’s transforma-
tion heightened its representation 
of the Nazi ideology, implying its 
termination with the Soviet capture 
of Berlin in 1945. The dominance of 
Berlin added substantial meaning to 
Soviet monuments. 
 The Soviet memorials in Berlin 
serve a similar purpose in imposing 
Soviet sacrifice, victory, and superi-
ority, though they do so in different 
ways. The quick construction, mili-
taristic aspects, and central location 
in Tiergarten reflect the prominent 
role of Soviet sacrifice in Allied vic-
tory. The delicate artistic methodol-
ogy of the Treptower and Pankow 
memorials create a shared educa-
tional theme through inscriptions, 
architecture, and location. The 
grandeur and active use of the Trep-
tower monument add messages in 
celebrating liberation and heroism. 
 The rapid and grand construction 
of the Tiergarten memorial sends 
a clear message of dominance. The 
Red Army began building three 
months after the war and finished 
three months later.23 The New York 
Herald Tribune wrote that the 
Tiergarten memorial was the larg-
est monument in Berlin during its 
building.24 Though unconfirmed, 
the statement expressed the wide-
spread perception of a grandiose 
and impressive undertaking. About 
2,000 Red Army soldiers are buried 
on the grounds, out of 80,000 who 
died in the Battle of Berlin.25 The 
monument’s spectacle, size, and de-
tail is utterly disproportionate to the 
commemoration of approximate-
ly 2.5% of fallen Soviets during the 
Battle of Berlin. Doing so in a city 
still laying in ruins suggests Soviet 
postwar priorities in promoting its 
dominance.  
 When visiting, observers first no-
tice the Tiergarten memorial’s heavy 
weapons.26 Two T-34 tanks, among 
the first to arrive in Berlin in 1945 
with the Red Army, are placed to the 
right and left.27 Behind them sit the 
two artillery pieces the Red Army 
used to proclaim the Battle of Ber-
lin’s conclusion.28 Placing the weap-
ons at a prevalent, forward position 
draws the viewer’s attention to the 
militaristic aspects, and reminds the 
observer of Soviet military domi-
nance. 
 The Tiergarten memorial derives 
the most significance from its loca-
tion. Positioned in the British sector 
after the war suggests an intention 
to communicate with Western audi-
ences. To its Western wartime allies, 
the memorial emphasized the Soviet 
necessity to victory over Nazism. It 
also reminded West Berliners that 
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they too had been defeated by the 
Red Army. The memorial stands on 
the busy Straße des 17. Juni, ensur-
ing that it would serve as an every-
day reminder to its Western passers-
by. 
 Additionally, it was a symbolic 
spot in Nazi “Germania” plans of 
reconstructing the city according 
to the new ideology. Adolph Hitler 
and Albert Speer, the chief architect, 
intended to build the Nazi “victory 
avenue” in the same spot.29 Selecting 
this location as a “literal barrier” to 
Nazi triumph was a communist ex-
pression of ideological superiority 
to fascism.30
 The Tiergarten monument posi-
tion in the middle of other Berlin 
landmarks exemplifies the Soviet 
imprint on history. The Branden-
burg Gate, an eighteenth-century 
tribute to peace, and the Bundestag, 
where the iconic Reichstag stood, 
are within a few minutes’ walk. The 
Berlin Victory Column, a commem-
oration of Prussian unification, sits a 
mile west along Straße des 17. Juni. 
This sector, dense with monuments, 
memorialized significant periods of 
German and Berlin history.31 The 
Soviet memorial’s addition to the 
already defined space forces the in-
clusion of Soviet victory into the city 
and country’s commemoration. 
 The delicate methodology of the 
Treptower and Pankow memori-
als comprise an educative purpose 
through location, inscriptions, and 
architecture. Positioned in East Ber-
lin, the audiences for these monu-
ments differed from that of Tiergar-
ten. They were built in 1949, giving 
Soviet planners time to carefully 
craft every aspect to communicate 
specific messages.  Monumental 
inscriptions suggest a message of 
education. The entrances at Trep-
tower and Pankow are marked with 
phrases in Russian on one side and 
German on the other, including 
a German translation invites the 
German populace to understand 
the Soviet message. By contrast, the 
Tiergarten memorial itself is only 
in Russian, save for an English in-
scription on the side. The effect of 
mirroring the German and Russian 
is symbolic in expressing the impor-
tance of reformation to the Soviets. 
The purpose of reeducating German 
visitors is key to the Soviet emphasis 
on maintaining East Germany as an 
ally. 
 Located in peripheral spots out-
side the center city, visitors must go 
out of their way to view these two 
memorials. Unlike the Tiergarten 
memorial, located on a busy street, 
East Germans would have to make 
an intended effort to visit. Planners 
emphasized this idea of a pilgrimage 
in the architectural layouts. Both 
memorials are narrow shaped with 
the only entrances on one extreme 
end. The unique arrangement forc-
es the observer to view the memo-
rials in a particular viewpoint. As 
one enters, they immediately see the 
main sculpture of each monument. 
As they walk toward the monu-
ment, successive features become 
pronounced and impact the per-
spective as they approach the main 
sculpture. Leaders manipulated the 
layouts to enhance the memorials’ 
educative features. 
 Non-militaristic features com-
municate messages through inscrip-
tions and memorial layouts. The 
Pankow and Treptower memorials 
include a statue of Mother Home-
land, a figure mourning the death 
of her son.32 They both include 16 
tombs to commemorate the sacri-
fice of each Soviet republic.33 The ex-
clusion of weapons and prominence 
of death emphasizes the sorrow of 
these sites. In conjunction with edu-
cating the German population, they 
highlight the war’s human toll. 
 To a greater degree than the Trep-
tower memorial, however, Soviet 
leaders focused on the total war-
time cost in the Pankow memorial. 
The site was an area where families 
would enjoy recreational activity in 
the nineteenth century before be-
coming a labor camp during World 
War II. Resembling a cemetery, the 
Pankow memorial carries on this 
theme of gloom. On its ground 
are the remains of over 13,000 Red 
Army soldiers, serving as the larg-
est Soviet burial site in Berlin.34 The 
names of thousands who fell in the 
Battle of Berlin are chiseled into 
stone, producing a sense of guilt for 
German visitors.35
 The main feature of Pankow is 
Mother Homeland, shown crying 
about the loss of her son in com-
bat with a flag of victory – again, 
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reminding the German audience 
of the great Soviet victory. She sits 
atop a pedestal with the words “Not 
in vain was the death and the flow-
ing blood of the Soviet soldiers. 
Not in vain the sorrow and tears of 
the grieving mothers, widow and 
orphans. They call to fight for the 
eternal peace among all people.”36 
The imagery is another evocation of 
guilt for the Germans, attempting 
to convey the losses of the Soviet 
masses during the war to the Ger-
man audience. As the main point of 
the monument Mother Homeland 
emits a somber tone for the me-
morial as a whole. These carefully 
planned features encourage remorse 
in the visitor. 
The Treptower site concentrates 
on ideological superiority through 
symbols of liberation and triumph. 
The design’s background illustrates 
ideological themes. The Soviet ad-
ministration held a competition 
open to Germans and Soviets for 
designs of the memorial in 1946.37 
The inclusion of German planners 
encouraged the participation of the 
populace in re-education efforts. 
Competition criteria were com-
memorating fallen Soviets in the 
Battle of Berlin and expressing the 
reason for their sacrifice, defined as 
the “international liberation mission 
of the Soviet Army.”38 The message 
of liberation is twofold: it reminds 
Germans of its past oppressive sys-
tem, while expressing Soviet victory 
in defeating this institution.  
 The artistic features tell the So-
viet story of liberation. The sixteen 
sarcophagi lining the sides each 
have bas-relief works accompanied 
by text, which tell a story as an ob-
server walks from one to the next. It 
shows Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet 
Union, explaining that the German 
intention was to destroy the Sovi-
et people through enslavement or 
death.39 Emphasizing the German 
invasion, the monument depicts the 
Soviets as innocent, having been 
forced to fight for their own free-
dom. This depiction reflects a nar-
row interpretation of ideological 
battle based on moral superiority. It 
is important that the bas-reliefs have 
“no direct reference” to the German 
people because it avoid blaming the 
German audience and invites them 
to join the “anti-facist resistance sto-
ry.”40 
 The towering Red Army soldier 
contrasts the subtle bas-reliefs by 
acting as the memorial’s clear cen-
terpiece. He stands heroically with a 
long sword in one hand, small child 
in the other arm, and stomps on a 
swastika. The liberation message is 
clear as the child clings to him for 
protection. The popular Great Patri-
otic War narrative predicates on this 
message of liberation. The Treptow-
er memorial, specifically the Red 
Army statue, came to embody the 
war cult.41
 The Soviets and East Germans 
employed the Treptower site for 
political purposes. Physically, the 
monument covers an expansive 
area of nearly a square kilometer.42 
While the size exhibits grandeur in 
itself, communist ideologues used 
it for celebrations of Victory Day 
and Liberation Day.43 The function-
al use is consistent with the Great 
Patriotic War mindset that “no one 
is forgotten, nothing is forgotten,” 
deriving meaning from past suffer-
ing.44 Holding celebratory events 
there gave it an active role, continu-
ally imposing the idea of liberation. 
Although communicating different 
messages, the Soviet memorials in 
Tiergarten, Pankow, and Treptower 
advanced a common postwar Soviet 
agenda. 
Post-Communism
 The interpretations of the Sovi-
et war memorials in Berlin have 
changed significantly over time. 
Originally, intentions were rooted 
in the events of the Second World 
War, aimed at educating the Ger-
man population on the Soviet nar-
rative, commemorating sacrifice, 
and reminding the Western Allies of 
the indispensable wartime role. As 
Europe settled into division in what 
would be called the Cold War, Berlin 
became a flashpoint and microcosm 
of greater struggle. The messages of 
these monuments shifted with re-
gional and world developments. Af-
ter the fall of communism many in 
Eastern Europe viewed Soviet me-
morials as symbols of domination 
and suppression, a sentiment many 
continue to harbor today. In recent 
years, Vladimir Putin’s leadership 
has revived Russia’s regional and 
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global position in part by adopt-
ing Soviet strategies. This trend has 
renewed disagreements about the 
meaning of Soviet symbols. 
 The complex politics of remem-
brance swept through Eastern Eu-
rope in the wake of communist col-
lapse. Street names and monuments 
in Berlin were caught in the cross-
hairs of contentious debate as the 
population grappled with interpret-
ing the GDR’s legacy. The Party of 
Democratic Socialism (PDS), previ-
ously in power as the Socialist Uni-
ty Party, fought to maintain com-
munist-era names in city districts 
it controlled.45 The democratically 
elected PDS exhibited considerable 
support from the people. As the West 
German Parliament agreed to move 
the unified capital to Berlin in 1991, 
the city government formed a com-
mission to evaluate street names, 
instructed to change any who “op-
posed one totalitarian dictatorship, 
that of the National Socialists, in or-
der to replace it with another totali-
tarian dictatorship, that of the Com-
munists.”46 This narrow guideline 
displayed the government intention 
to create a politically “correct” and 
representative capital for unified 
Germany.47 The Bundestag imposed 
what constituted politically correct, 
opposing a historical interpretation 
favoring communism. 
 The qualifications considered po-
litically appropriate for street names 
were polarizing, highlighting the 
complexities of the previous era’s 
understanding. Conservatives gen-
erally regarded communists and fas-
cists in the same light, unworthy of 
commemoration with street names, 
while leftists favored anti-fascists, 
regardless of their political back-
ground48 The ideological links be-
tween anti-fascism and communism 
resulted in overlapping traits, ruling 
out many candidates from the Left. 
 The public’s response to East Ger-
man monuments illustrated another 
example of contested memory. Calls 
for the removal of all GDR monu-
ments were reminiscent of postwar 
denazification.49 The Allies agreed 
that Nazi symbols needed remov-
al to “make a break with the past,” 
resulting in Germany’s “unwisely 
buried and denied” history.50 The 
overall trend left an “unspoken ab-
sence which somehow reinforces 
the memory of the Hitler period.”51 
Berliners applied the memories and 
lessons from the Nazi period to 
decide on the fate of GDR monu-
ments. This way of moving on from 
the Nazi period in such a way stuck 
in the memory of Berliners. 
 The Post-GDR Era differed from 
the post-Nazi period because East 
Germans were ambivalent about 
the communist past.52 These mixed 
feelings were a stark contrast to the 
general agreement of the German 
population against Nazism, ren-
dering policy about monuments 
difficult to agree upon. Additional-
ly, no country imposed beliefs onto 
the populace. The freedom granted 
to each citizen further complicat-
ed popular agreement on policy. 
Students formed the Initiative on 
Public Monuments of the GDR to 
encourage informed public discus-
sion about individual sites.53 The 
mature approach demonstrated an 
improved understanding of the im-
plications associated with removing 
monuments. 
 Unlike the controversies sur-
rounding communist monuments 
and street names, no one seriously 
considered taking down the Berlin 
Soviet war memorials. The East and 
West German governments agreed 
to protect the memorials in return 
for the removal of Red Army troops 
from Germany in the September 
1990 “Treaty on the Final Settle-
ment with Respect to Germany.”54 
The nature of the alliance between 
the Soviets and East Germans, in-
cluding Soviet influence in the GDR 
state and ideology, made Soviet me-
morials more symbolic than street 
names and East German monu-
ments. There is ample evidence that 
these monuments would have been 
targets of anti-communist acts. 
Signing strong protective measures 
in advance indicates the Soviet un-
derstanding of the regional politi-
cal environment. The remembrance 
of other memorials’ degradation 
throughout Eastern Europe as So-
viet soldiers pulled back was fresh 
in Soviet minds.55 Wanting to avoid 
further humiliation and disrespect, 
the Soviets used foresight and lever-
age to guarantee this would not oc-
cur in Berlin. 
 Contentious deliberation was not 
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unique to Germany. Former com-
munist states across Eastern Europe 
struggle with the historical experi-
ence of the Soviet Union. Romanian 
politicians issued the Proclamation 
of Timişoara in 1990, proposing 
that former high-ranking commu-
nists be banned from public office 
for ten years.56 Subject to years of de-
bate, the proposal represented pop-
ular disagreement about the former 
regime. Russia experienced wide-
spread condemnation of the Soviet 
Union in the early 1990s. Veterans 
and monuments became frequent 
targets for their representation of 
the failed Soviet system.57Attacks 
on the Soviet liberation narrative 
were rampant and drew compar-
isons to fascism, contradictory to 
fundamental communist beliefs.58 
National humiliation encompassed 
Russia until the mid-1990s econom-
ic depression set in. At the 1993 Vic-
tory Day Demonstration, many of 
the common people joined the cele-
bration in defense of Red Army vet-
erans, relating their own struggle in 
the economic downturn to the vig-
orous criticisms against the veter-
ans’ efforts.59 Equating the veterans 
to their achievements, this aligning 
gesture defended Soviet accom-
plishments and victory. The idea of 
the Great Patriotic War emphasizing 
martyrdom, suffering, and trauma, 
linked these two previously sparring 
groups. 
 Putin’s rise to power in the early 
2000s ushered in an era of Russian 
reassertion of Great Power status. 
He has capitalized on the idea of 
the Great Patriotic War to height-
en nationalism and unify the Rus-
sian people to support geopolitical 
objectives, such as aggression in 
Ukraine and Georgia. The politics 
of remembrance are especially prev-
alent in Russia’s resurgence as a re-
gional power. A side effect has been 
the revitalization of historical inter-
pretations consistent with the origi-
nal intentions of Soviet monument 
planners. 
 The Communist Party’s reception 
of World War II victory illuminates 
why the Soviets invested so heavily 
in public works. The war legitimized 
the Soviet system, so building “pub-
lic displays of loyalty” was a way to 
continually remind people of Soviet 
control.60 In erecting monuments, 
leaders could impose carefully se-
lected messages onto audiences. 
Aleksandr Nekrich presents an in-
teresting example of censorship, as 
he fought at the Battle of Stalingrad 
and later challenged the notion of 
the “suddenness” of the 1941 Ger-
man invasion in a book.61 The KGB 
redacted this section, revoked his 
Communist Party membership, and 
no longer allowed him to write.62 
This brutal restriction hindered the 
ability of the individual, and wit-
ness, to deviate from the official nar-
rative. Like the “Nekrich Affair,” the 
active promotion of liberation at the 
Treptower memorial reminds indi-
viduals of the state’s power. 
 The renewed sense of historical 
pride has established the central po-
litical role of remembrance in East-
ern and Central Europe. The Russian 
state under Putin has reinvigorated 
the memory and mission of the So-
viet Union, synonymizing the past 
system with the present state. Soviet 
monuments have taken on renewed 
meaning in the modern Russian 
state. As the memorials continue 
to have an active life, their conten-
tion has complicated contemporary 
regional relations. Recent laws per-
mitting the removal of Soviet mon-
uments, accompanied with rampant 
vandalism, have soured relations 
between Russia and former Soviet 
bloc states. In 2006 someone stole 
60 bronze pieces from the memo-
rial in Pankow, Berlin to which the 
Russian embassy protested.63 Op-
posing interpretations of history are 
visible. The Russians, defending the 
commemoration of liberation and 
freedom, and many in Eastern Eu-
rope who perceive them as tributes 
to Soviet dominance. The fusion of 
Russian and Soviet identity means 
that threats of removal are taken as 
insulting to Russia. The resurgence 
of Russia as a significant European 
power has politicized the issue and 
strengthened justifications for their 
standing. 
 No instance better illustrates Rus-
sia’s assumption of the Soviet legacy 
than the 2007 relocation of a Red 
Army “liberator” statue in Tallinn. 
The move was celebrated by some, 
citing it as a symbol of Soviet dom-
inance and repression.64 It was met 




Russian government, proponents 
of the liberation view, and Estonia’s 
nearly one-fourth ethnic Russian 
population.65 The Russian outcry 
was considerable for a city in which 
it has a miniscule stake compared 
to Berlin. The symbolic value of 
Berlin as the capital of the Soviet 
rival ideology which it captured af-
ter a traumatizing war is extreme. 
Accounting for Russian protests to 
smaller instances of vandalism, like 
Pankow in 2006, one can assume a 
Tallinn-scale act would prompt a 
grave Russian response.  
 Preserving Soviet memorials is a 
way to perpetuate the memory of 
Soviet success. It creates a self-re-
inforcing cycle, justifying the con-
temporary rationalization serves 
to improve future prospects of its 
existence. Proponents of Soviet me-
morials concentrate on the act of the 
victory, resembling the 1945 Soviet 
liberator interpretation. Others view 
them as expressions of Soviet dom-
ination, instead focusing on the in-
ability to interpret history individu-
ally during the Soviet period. These 
polarized understandings represent 
the collective past struggles of indi-
viduals. 
Conclusion
 The Soviet monuments located 
in Berlin exemplify the impact of 
shifting contexts on the meaning of 
public space. Initially imposing So-
viet dominance and ideology, they 
still stand today, albeit with vary-
ing meanings according to different 
people. The Berlin memorials epit-
omize the Soviet paradox by sug-
gesting that the Soviet spirit is alive. 
With contemporary Russia assum-
ing the Soviet Union’s legacy, Rus-
sians retain the Soviet sentiments 
of ideology, war memory, and sym-
bolism found in the details of the 
Tiergarten, Pankow, and Treptower 
memorials. Additionally, Soviet me-
morials have acquired new meaning 
as representative of the Soviet past 
and Russian present and future, 
adding an active political role.  
 Russia’s geopolitical reorientation 
means that Soviet memorials will be 
at the forefront of future controver-
sy. Though people will remember 
Soviet repression, Russia will over-
take the memorials’ symbolism. No 
end is in sight for the memorials in 
Berlin. Diplomacy between Russian 
and German delegations will be 
necessary, as the agreement states 
no expiration. It will require a con-
certed effort, as they are much too 
large and complex to simply move 
or take down. Whether Soviet plan-
ners purposely included seeming-
ly endless life as an expression of 
domination is doubtful. However, 
the contemporary political environ-
ment created largely from the Soviet 
past seems to suggest eternal life for 
the Berlin memorials. 
1. Cochrane, Allan. “Making Up 
Meanings in a Capital City: Power, 
Memory and Monuments in Berlin.” 
European Urban and Regional Stud-
ies 13, no. 1 (January 2006): 5–24. 
doi:10.1177/0969776406060827.
2. Stanley G. Payne, “Fascism and Com-
munism,” Totalitarian Movements & Politi-
cal Religions 1, no. 3 (2000): 3. 
3. Stanley G. Payne, “Fascism and Com-
munism,” Totalitarian Movements & Politi-
cal Religions 1, no. 3 (2000): 3. 
4. Stanley G. Payne, “Fascism and Com-
munism,” Totalitarian Movements & Politi-
cal Religions 1, no. 3 (2000): 3. 
5. Stanley G. Payne, “Fascism and Com-
munism,” Totalitarian Movements & Politi-
cal Religions 1, no. 3 (2000): 3. 
6. Stanley G. Payne, “Fascism and Com-
munism,” Totalitarian Movements & Politi-
cal Religions 1, no. 3 (2000): 5.
7. Stanley G. Payne, “Fascism and Com-
munism,”Totalitarian Movements & Politi-
cal Religions 1, no. 3 (2000): 6. 
8. Stanley G. Payne, “Fascism and Com-
munism,” Totalitarian Movements & Politi-
cal Religions 1, no. 3 (2000): 6-7. 
9. Stanley G. Payne, “Fascism and Com-
munism,” Totalitarian Movements & Politi-
cal Religions 1, no. 3 (2000): 8. 
10. Jeff Rutherford, Combat and Genocide 
on the Eastern Front: The German Infantry’s 
War, 1941-1944 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 94.
11. Jeff Rutherford, Combat and Genocide 
on the Eastern Front: The German Infantry’s 
War, 1941-1944 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 94-5.
12. Jeff Rutherford, Combat and Genocide 
on the Eastern Front: The German Infantry’s 
War, 1941-1944 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 94.
13. Jeff Rutherford, Combat and Genocide 
on the Eastern Front: The German Infantry’s 
War, 1941-1944 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
47
VOL V || ISSUE I || FALL 2020
University Press, 2014), 94.
14. Jeff Rutherford, Combat and Genocide 
on the Eastern Front: The German Infantry’s 
War, 1941-1944 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 87.
15. Jeff Rutherford, Combat and Genocide 
on the Eastern Front: The German Infantry’s 
War, 1941-1944 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 92.
16. Jeff Rutherford, Combat and Genocide 
on the Eastern Front: The German Infantry’s 
War, 1941-1944 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 375.
17. Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars: From 
World War to Cold War, 1939-1953 (Lon-
don: Yale University Press, 2007), 5.
18. Amos Rapaport, “On the Nature of 
Capitals and their Physical Expression,” in 
Capital Cities/Les Capitales: International 
Perspectives/Perspectives Internationales, 
ed. John Taylor, Jean G. Lengelle, and Car-
oline Andrew (Montreal: MQUIP, 1993), 
33.
19. Amos Rapaport, “On the Nature of 
Capitals and their Physical Expression,” in 
Capital Cities/Les Capitales: International 
Perspectives/Perspectives Internationales, 
ed. John Taylor, Jean G. Lengelle, and Car-
oline Andrew (Montreal: MQUIP, 1993), 
35-8. 
20. Amos Rapaport, “On the Nature of 
Capitals and their Physical Expression,” in 
Capital Cities/Les Capitales: International 
Perspectives/Perspectives Internationales, 
ed. John Taylor, Jean G. Lengelle, and Car-
oline Andrew (Montreal: MQUIP, 1993), 
35-8. 
21. Amos Rapaport, “On the Nature of 
Capitals and their Physical Expression,” in 
Capital Cities/Les Capitales: International 
Perspectives/Perspectives Internationales, 
ed. John Taylor, Jean G. Lengelle, and Car-
oline Andrew (Montreal: MQUIP, 1993), 
36-42.
22. Amos Rapaport, “On the Nature of 
Capitals and their Physical Expression,” 
Capital Cities/Les Capitales: International 
Perspectives/Perspectives Internationales, 
ed. John Taylor, Jean G. Lengelle, and Car-
oline Andrew (Montreal: MQUIP, 1993), 
43.
23. Carl Levin, “Red Memorial Rises in 
Berlin for Army Dead,” New York Herald 
Tribune (New York City, NY), Aug. 19, 
1945. 
24. Carl Levin, “Red Memorial Rises in 
Berlin for Army Dead,” New York Herald 
Tribune (New York City, NY), Aug. 19, 
1945. 
25. “Cemeteries and Other Burial Sites.” 
Soviet Memorial in the Tiergarten / State 




26. For this section, the writer visually 
interpreted the monuments using Google 
Earth. 
27. “Cemeteries and Other Burial Sites.” 
Soviet Memorial in the Tiergarten / State 




28. “Cemeteries and Other Burial Sites.” 
Soviet Memorial in the Tiergarten / State 




29. “Cemeteries and Other Burial Sites.” 
Soviet Memorial in the Tiergarten / State 




30. “Cemeteries and Other Burial Sites.” 
Soviet Memorial in the Tiergarten / State 




31. Hannes Saarinen, “Symbolic Places 
in Berlin Before and After the Fall of the 
Wall,” in The Cold War and Politics of His-
tory, ed. by Juhana Aunesluoma and Puli 
Kettunen (Helsinki: Edita Publishing Ltd., 
2008), 100.
32. “Cemeteries and Other Burial Sites.” 
Soviet Memorial in the Tiergarten / State 




33. “Cemeteries and Other Burial Sites.” 
Soviet Memorial in the Tiergarten / State 




34. “Cemeteries and Other Burial Sites.” 
Soviet Memorial in the Tiergarten / State 




35. Courtney Glore Crimmins. “Ruin, Res-
toration, and Return: Aesthetic Unification 
in Post-Socialist East Berlin” (doctorate 
thesis, University of Michigan, 2012), 29. 
36. Courtney Glore Crimmins. “Ruin, Res-
toration, and Return: Aesthetic Unification 
in Post-Socialist East Berlin” (doctorate 
thesis, University of Michigan, 2012), 29. 
37. Courtney Glore Crimmins. “Ruin, Res-
toration, and Return: Aesthetic Unification 
in Post-Socialist East Berlin” (doctorate 
thesis, University of Michigan, 2012), 29. 
38. Courtney Glore Crimmins. “Ruin, Res-
toration, and Return: Aesthetic Unification 
in Post-Socialist East Berlin” (doctorate 
thesis, University of Michigan, 2012), 29. 
39. Paul Stangl, “The Soviet War Memorial 
in Treptow, Berlin,” Geographical Review 
93, no. 2 (2003): 223. 
40. Courtney Glore Crimmins. “Ruin, Res-
toration, and Return: Aesthetic Unification 
in Post-Socialist East Berlin” (doctorate 
thesis, University of Michigan, 2012), 30.
41. Nina Tumarkin, The Living and the 
Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World 
War II in Russia (New York: BasicBooks, 
1994), 220.
42. “Cemeteries and Other Burial Sites.” 
Soviet Memorial in Treptower Park / State 
of Berlin.
43. Paul Stangl, “The Soviet War Memorial 
48
THE INTERNATIONALIST
in Treptow, Berlin,” Geographical Review 
93, no. 2 (2003): 217. 
44. Nina Tumarkin, The Living and the 
Dead: The Living and the Dead: The Rise 
and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Rus-
sia (New York: BasicBooks, 1994), 14. 
45. Ulla Spittler and Gerd Knischewski, 
“Redefining German Identity: Case Studies 
in Berlin,” Journal of Area Studies 3, no. 7 
(1995): 107.
46. Brian Ladd, The Ghosts of Berlin: 
Confronting German History in the Urban 
Landscape (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1998), 210.
47. Ulla Spittler and Gerd Knischewski, 
“Redefining German Identity: Case Studies 
in Berlin,” Journal of Area Studies 3, no. 7 
(1995): 107.
48. Brian Ladd, The Ghosts of Berlin: 
Confronting German History in the Urban 
Landscape (Chicago: University of Chica-
go Press, 1998), 210. 
49. Brian Ladd, The Ghosts of Berlin: 
Confronting German History in the Urban 
Landscape (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1998), 193. 
50. Hannes Saarinen, “Symbolic Places 
in Berlin Before and After the Fall of the 
Wall,” in The Cold War and Politics of His-
tory, ed. by Juhana Aunesluoma and Puli 
Kettunen (Helsinki: Edita Publishing Ltd., 
2008), 86. 
51. Allan Cochrane, “Making Up Mean-
ings in a Capital City: Power, Memory and 
Monuments in Berlin,” European Urban 
and Regional Studies 13, no. 1 (2006): 14.
52. Allan Cochrane, “Making Up Mean-
ings in a Capital City: Power, Memory and 
Monuments in Berlin,” European Urban 
and Regional Studies, no. 1 (2006): 18.
53. Brian Ladd, The Ghosts of Berlin: 
Confronting German History in the Urban 
Landscape(Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1998), 193. 
54. Thomas L. Friedman, “Four Allies Give 
Up Rights in Germany,” New York Times 
(New York City, NY), Sept. 13, 1990.
55. Thomas L. Friedman, “Four Allies Give 
Up Rights in Germany,” New York Times 
(New York City, NY), Sept. 13, 1990.
56. Grigore Pop-Eleches, “Romania Twen-
ty Years After Communism,” in Twenty 
Years After Communism: The Politics of 
Memory and Commemoration, ed. Michael 
Bernhard and Jan Kubik (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 2014), 90.
57. Anna Krylova, “Dancing on the Graves 
of the Dead: Building a World War II Me-
morial in Post-Soviet Russia,” in Memory 
and the Impact of Political Transformation 
in Public Space, ed. Daniel J. Walkowitz 
and Lisa Maya Knauer (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2004), 85. 
58. Anna Krylova, “Dancing on the Graves 
of the Dead: Building a World War II Me-
morial in Post-Soviet Russia,” in Memory 
and the Impact of Political Transformation 
in Public Space, ed. Daniel J. Walkowitz 
and Lisa Maya Knauer (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2004), 87. 
59. Anna Krylova, “Dancing on the Graves 
of the Dead: Building a World War II Me-
morial in Post-Soviet Russia,” in Memory 
and the Impact of Political Transformation 
in Public Space, ed. Daniel J. Walkowitz 
and Lisa Maya Knauer (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2004), 93. 
60. Nina Tumarkin, The Living and the 
Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World 
War II in Russia (New York: BasicBooks, 
1994), 92.
61. Nina Tumarkin, The Living and the 
Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World 
War II in Russia (New York: BasicBooks, 
1994), 135.
62. Nina Tumarkin, TThe Living and the 
Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World 
War II in Russia (New York: BasicBooks, 
1994), 135.
63. “Russian Embassy Protests as Ber-
lin Soviet War Memorial Vandalized,” 
BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union 




64. Pivli Torsti, “Why Do History Politics 
Matter? The Case of the Bronze Tallinn 
Soldier,” in The Cold War and Politics of 
History, ed. by Juhana Aunesluoma and 
Puli Kettunen (Helsinki: Edita Publishing 
Ltd., 2008), 26.
65. Pivli Torsti, “Why Do History Politics 
Matter? The Case of the Bronze Tallinn 
Soldier,” in The Cold War and Politics of 
History, ed. by Juhana Aunesluoma and 
Puli Kettunen (Helsinki: Edita Publishing 
Ltd., 2008), 20. 
49
VOL V || ISSUE I || FALL 2020
This was taken on Mt. Trebević during Emma Holmes’ gap year living in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. She 
had taken the cable car up the mountain with her cohort on October 27, 2019 to see the bobsled track used in the 
1984 Winter Olympics.
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